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I HE economy began a recovery in the second
quarter of 1975 and made significant advances in its
first year. In the last two quarters, however, the pace
of economic activity has been less robust. The econ-
omy’s performance in this most recent period has
triggered a great deal of concern over the sustain-
ability of the recovery. These fears have probably
been intensified by a number of considerations, in-
cluding the fact that the unemployment rate has
risen recently — a development not generally ob-
served at this point in a recovery. In addition, con-
cern over the economy was no doubt heightened by
the political campaigns conducted in this election
year where the release of any economic news, whether
good or bad, sparked considerable public discussion.
Analysts have offered a whole host of explanations
for the current economic lull. Some seem more credi-
ble than others, bnt when recent developments are
placed in perspective, a less pessimistic economic
picture is painted.
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The term “pause” has been employed by analysts
to describe the current state of economic activity.
Although popular, use of the term is a bit misleading
since it implies some degree of stagnation or inactivity.
While developments of the last two quarters have
not been favorably regarded by sonic analysts, the
economy has not been inactive or stagnant. Its up-
ward momentum, however, has moderated since the
spring of 1976 and it is this period of slower growth
towhich the term “pause” refers.
Measures of aggregate output are often cited as
evidence of this slowing. For example, real GNP ex-
panded by more than 7 percent during the first year
of the recovery from the 1973-75 recession. In the
past two quarters this measnre of aggregate output
has slowed to about a 4 percent rate of growth. In-
dustrial production, another measure of the nation’s
output, posted a substantial gain of about 15 percent
during the first 12 months of the recovery which be-
gan in early 1975. Since March, however, this meas-
ure of real output has slowed to about a 5 percent
pace.
The unemployment rate, after peaking at 8.9 per-
cent in May 1975, responded to the forces of recov-
ery and began a descent which carried it to 7.3 per-
cent in June 1976. Since then, however, this rate has
tended to rise and stood at 8.1 percent in November.
Personal income, which registered an 11.1 percent
advance in the first year of the recovery, has since
exhibited a more modest 8.6 percent rate of growth.
Along with this slowdown in income, consumption
expenditures have also displayed some signs of slug-
gishness. For instance, from first quarter 1975 to first
quarter 1976, personal consumption expenditures rose
by almost 12 percent, somewhat more robust than
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the nearly 9 percent growth rate registered since the
first quarter of this year. Growth of consumption ex-
penditures adjusted for price changes fell from about
6 to 4 percent over the same time periods.
Retail sales have likewise mirrored the pattern of
overall activity. During the first 12 months of the most
recent recovery, retail sales grew by more than 16
percent. Since March of this year, retail sales have
slowed to about a 6.4 percent rate of advance.
••
M~inetitr (iIi(. .F1$(
Both monetary and fiscal policies have been offered
by various analysts as factors contnbuting to the
pause.1 Some monetary analysts have pointed to the
relatively slow monetary growth in late 1975 and
early 1976 as a causal factor. Money (M1) grew at
only a 2.5 percent rate in tins period, after a rapid
7.4 percent rate in the previous two quarters. Studies
have been conducted which show that marked and
sustained fluctuations in money growth have iinpor-
tant effects on variations in output growth, and it
cannot be ruled out that some restrictive influence on
the economy resulted from this period of slower
money growth.
Another popular explanation for the current lull in
economic activity is associated with fiscal policy —
in particular, Federal Government spending. In the
first three quarters of the year, the Government spent
less than the amount budgeted. Estimates of the
amount of this “shortfall” range from $4 billion to
$17 billion. Proponents of this “underspending” view-
point argue that the deviation of actual expenditures
from planned or budgeted expenditures has acted to
restrain activity and, in fact, is one of the key factors
aflecting the current economic slowdown.2 This type
of argument, however, is somewhat suspect. The con-
census has usually been that economic activity is in-
fluenced by the “spent” government dollar. Now it
appears as if economic activity is sensitive to the “un-
spent” government dollar as well)
“A Longer Pause Than Expected.” Business Week, 18 Octo-
ber 1976, p. 36. Also, “Sagging 76— Slowdown Surprises
Most Analysts; Some Expect It To Persist,” Wall Street jour-
nal, 6 October 1976.
2
See The Federal Budget; its impact on the Economy, The
Conference Board, October 27, 1976.
3
To the extent that economic forecasts are based on planned
expenditures, the shortfall in expenditures can serve as an ex-
planation of why forecasts of economic activity differ from
actual performance. But this is quite a different argument
from the one advanced above.
A less stimulative fiscal policy hosvever, is evident
from recent trends in actual Government expendi-
tures. Over the past three quarters of this year, Fed-
eral expenditures have increased at a 5.4 percent
rate, compared to a 12.8 percent rate in calendar
1975. To the extent that Government spending has
an impact on economic activity independent of mone-
tary actions, this measure of fiscal policy does imply
a slowing in the pace of economic activity. But the
extent of the implied slowing is less than that asso-
ciated with the so-called “shortfall” argument above.
Lack of business confidence is also said to have
played some part in the current hesitation in eco-
nomic growth, although this explanation is difficult
to denionstrate,4 Uncertainty about future economic
policies always exists, but it is especially great in
election years. Expectations of future government
actions, such as tax policies regarding business, can
greatly influence investment decisions made in the cur-
rent period. One such consideration is the investment
tax credit. Since current discussion suggests the possi-
bility of increasing the amount of the credit, business-
men may be taking a wait-and-see attitude with regard
to capital expansion programs, thus contributing to
the more modest rate of economic expansion.
The behavior of business inventories over the cur-
rent recovery offers another explanation for the re-
cent pause.5 Movements in inventories in the current
recession/recovery period have been very large by
historical standards. Real inventory swings were quite
severe in early 1975 with a $21 billion annual rate of
decumulation in the second quarter. From the fourth
quarter of last year to the first quarter of this year,
inventories exhibited a large swing, from a run-off at
a $5.5 billion annual rate to a $10.4 billion annual
rate of accumulation. This sharp rebuilding of inven-
tories boosted GNP growth in the first quarter to an
unsustainable 9.2 percent rate. In the subsequent two
quarters, inventories were accumulated at about the
same rate as in the first quarter, thus providing no
further impetus to GNP growth rates.6
4
Statcment by Arthur F. Bums, Chairman, Board of Covemors
of the Federal Reserve System, before the U.S. Senate, Com-
mittee on Banking, housing and Urban Affairs, November 11,
1976.
5
Burton C. Malkiel, Council of Economic Advisers, “U.S. Eco-
nonuc Outlook” (Speech delivered before the 1977 U.S. Out-
look Conference, November 15-18, 1976).
°The arithmetic of how inventories affect the level of CNP in
a given period and the change in CNP between penods is
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Tab:e I
The Pattern of Economic Growth in Recoveries
CHANGE IN REAL
REAL GNP INVENTORY INVESTMENT REAL FiNAL SALES MONEY SUPPLY
Corrpoundnd Annual Billions ~or..poundod Annual compounded Annual
Rafts at Change of Dollars Rates of Change Rates of C hanoi’
Fr I Second F. rst Second First Secar,a First Second
Recession Vtar of Year of Year a’ Yea at Year of Year of Year of Yea, of
Tra~.qh Expansion Expancion Expansion Expansion Expansion Expansion Espannion Exporsion
II 1954 75% 26% . SI? I $2.5 5.4% 30% ~.a% 12%
111958 8.7 11 5192 58.1 5.8 29 4.5 0.7
I 1961 7.0 3.2 ‘$14.4 $30 5.0 37 3.0 1.7
V.1970 4.6 73 -50.4 jS7.I 4.6 6.7 6.1 84
Ave’agc 70 3.7 5.2 .1.1 45 2.7
I 1975 7.3 4.1 ‘$30.9 $ 0.V 4.6 4.2 5.0 64’
Th.- I 17’’’ III’’;.’.
All of the factors mentioned in the explanations
above may have had some influence on the current
period of slowing. Upon further investigation, how-
ever, the inventory pattern appears to have been the
most influential factor.
In the first place, a moderation in the pace of eco-
nomic activity is not an unusual development at this
stage of the business cycle, as three out of the last four
recoveries have displayed such a slowing. In general,
the pattern of real GNP growth is one of acceleration
in the early stages of recovery, followed by a period of
deceleration and more moderate growth.
This pattern is depicted in Table I where the
growth in real GNP during the first year of each of
the last five expansions is contrasted with that in the
second year of expansion. Except for the recovery
which commenced in the fourth quarter of 1970,
economic growth in the second year has been notice-
ably less rapid than in the first. On average, real GNP
in the last four recoveries has increased at a 7.0 per-
cent rate in the first year, followed by a 3.7 percent
rate in the second year; this is very similar to the
respective 7.3 and 4.1 percent rates of advance re-
sometimes confusing. This confusion stems from the fact that
the change in the stock of inventories in a period adds to the
level of GNP in that period. Perhaps more confusing is that
the difference of the change in inventory levels from one pe-
riod to another affects the change in CNP from one period to
another. Thos a change in inventories levels of $10 billion irs
each of two quarters implies no change in CNP between the
two quarters, given everything else equal.
corded in the recovery to date. The tendency for
recoveries to exhibit some slowing at this stage sug-
gests the possibility of a common set of factors which
influencethe pattern of economic recovery.
The acceleration of real output growth in the early
stages of recoveries is influenced to a great extent by
the pattern of inventory investment. As shown in
Table I, changes in real inventory investment in the
first year of most recoveries have provided a sub-
stantial boost to GNP growth in that year; by the
second year, inventory stimulus to aggregate demand
growth has generally disappeared. Table I suggests,
however, that the influence of inventories on recent
real GNP growth has been even greater than in other
recoveries. The $31 billion swing in inventory invest-
ment in the first year of the current recovery is by far
the largest of the postwar period. The magnitude of
this swing largely reflects the sharp inventory decum-
ulation which occurred in 1974. The stage was set for
this decumulation in 1972 and 1973 when shortages,
price controls, and accelerating inflation resulted in
a speculative buildup of inventories. Therefore, at
least a portion of current movements in inventory in-
vestment is a response to these excesses and is inde-
pendent of more fundamental determinants, such as
the stance of aggregate demand policies.
Additional evidence of the impact of inventories
in the current period can be gleaned from an exam-
ination of real final sales, which is real GNP minus
changes in real inventories. In the recoveries which
began in 1954, 1958, and 1961, growth of real final
sales decelerated in the second year of economic ex-
pansion, as did real GNP. This indicates that the eco-
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nomic slowing extended beyond inventories and that
more fundamental factors were impacting on the econ-
omy. Probably the most important factor operating
during these periods was monetary growth. Table I
shows that the slowing in real final sales in the second
year of these expansions was accompanied by a les-
sening of the stimulus provided by monetary ex-
pansion. Only a very slight slowing in real final sales,
however, is detectable in the current recovery. This
suggests that aggregate demand policies have not
played a dominant role in the current period of
slower economic growth.
To sum up, the inventory pattern seems to have
masked the underlying growth pattern of the recov-
ery, as revealed by a fairly stable growth of final sales.
In retrospect, the strength of real GNP growth ex-
perienced in the first year of recovery was based
largely on the strong inventory rebuilding. The “pause”
in the past two quarters, on the other hand, largely
reflects the lack of further stimulus to GNP growth
from inventory investment rather than lack of stimu-
lus provided by stabilization policies.
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The high and recently rising unemployment rate
is a feature of the current recovery which has been
most disconcerting. The unemployment rate fell from
a high of 8.7 percent in the second quarter of 1975
to 7.6 percent in the first quarter of 1976. With the
period of slower real GNP growth this year, the un-
employment rate has reversed its downward course,
averaging 7.8 percent in the third quarter.
This recent upward movement in the unemploy-
ment rate is especially curious on two counts — it is
contrary to historical patterns and it occurred despite
relatively strong employment gains. The unemploy-
ment rate historically has registered its largest de-
clines during the first year of recovery. In the second
year this measure of labor market conditions has
tended to stabilize or fall somewhat further. In ad-
dition, total employment has risen rapidly in the
past two quarters when compared to the average
growth in the second year of several other recoveries
(see Table II). This suggests that the demand for
labor has not been the primary factor affecting the rise
in the unemployment rate.
The recent rise in the unemployment rate appears
to reflect atypical labor supply developments. Again,
The Pattern of Economic Growth
in Recent Recoveries
(Two.Quorter Annual Rates of Change)
S,s~an&lyAdjus’,d
referring to Table II, the labor force has expanded at
an unusually rapid rate in this recovery, especially in
the past two quarters. In the first year of recovery,
the labor force increased 1.9 percent — significantly
greater than the 0.9 percent average rate observed in
the first year of other recoveries. In the last two quar-
Table II
Labor Mat ket Developments in Recoveries
CiVILIAN EMPLOYMENT CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE
GROWTH GROWTH
Co’npoLinoed Annual Compo~nei:dAnnual
Rates of Change Rates a’ Change
First Second First Second
Recession Yaor of Year of Yeoi of Year a’
Trouph Expansion Expcnsian Expansion Expansion
II ‘954 2.8 °.o 3.4°c 1 .a% 3.2%
II 1958 3.2 2.0 0.8 2 1
I 1961 1.0 1.2 0.3 1.3
IV- 1910 7 2 1 ~ 2 7
Merage 2 2 2.5 09 23
1975 25 3.Y 9 39
1’
.10
~3 .2 -l 0 1 2 3 4 561 8
QUARTERS TO AND FROM TROUGHS
Latest dais ptoited~ 3rd qeari,,
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ters, labor force growth accelerated to a 3.9 percent
rate — noticeably higher than the 2.3 percent average
in the second year of previous recoveries. This unu-
sual growth of the labor force reflects both demo-
graphic factors which have worked to increase the
number of teenagers of working age and the increased
participation of those of working age, particularly
among teenagers and women.
The impact on the unemployment rate from the
increased supply of labor is magnified by the compo-
sition of this supply. Women and teenagers who are
entering the labor force in greater numbers tend to
have had a higher degree of unemployment among
their ranks. Chronic unemployment for these groups
is, in part, the result of a number of structural barriers
including minimum wage laws, discrimination, and
the lack of suitable work skills. As a result, demand-
oriented policies, unless accompanied by appropriate
structural reforms, are not likely to reduce unemploy-
ment to levels attained in other expansions without
accelerating inflation.
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Although some degs-ee of moderation has set in, the
expansion has not run its course. Some recent indi-
cators of economic activity suggest that GNP growth
in the fourth quarter of 1976 may be somewhat less
than the gro\vth recorded in the third quarter. I3ut
fundamental forces affecting demand and supply sug-
gest that such growth should be interpreted as chiefly
a random fluctuation and not indicative of the likely
future direction of economic activity.
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Monetary developments are a particularly important
determinant of fluctuations in economic activity, as
was discussed above. Table I showed that the three
recoveries which slowed in thc second year were ac-
companied by slower monetary growth. In the recov-
ery beginning in early 1971, economic growth accel-
erated in the second year, apparently reflecting the
acceleration in money growth.
The current stance of monetary policy appears to
be moderately expansive. In the past nine months,
Ml has increased at a 6 percent annual rate, above
the 4.9 percent growth observed in the first year of
economic expansion. While this growth of money, if
sustained over the long-term, is too rapid to make
progress in reducing inflation, such growth increases
the likelihood of some acceleration in the pace of
economic advances in 1977 from currently prevailing
rates.
While growth of aggregate demand is likely to ac-
celerate in 1977, a fundamental consideration is the
ability of the economy to translate these demands
into real goods and services. Measures of the utiliza-
tion of manufacturing capacity give some indication
of this capability.
A recent major revision of the Federal Reserve
Boards’ capacity utilization rate in manufacturing
has reduced substantially the amount of excess ca-
pacity which was previously thought to exist. Accord-
ing to the revised figures, manufacturing capacity
utilization is estimated to he at about 81 percent in
the third quarter, not significantly different from the
utilization rate achieved after six quarters in the pre-
vious three recoveries.
The comparability of utilization rates in both the
current and previous expansion periods is noteworthy,
since at the depths of the 1973-75 recession, manu-
facturing capacity utilization was less than in any
previous postwar recession. The recent 10 percentage
point gain in this utilization rate, however, was the
result of a slower-than-average increase in manufac-
turing capacity, rather than a greater-than-average
increase in output. This slower growth in capacity is
quite disconcerting since it has an effect on the ability
of the economy to quickly absorb all of the unem-
ployed labor resources at prevailing prices and wages
and to sustain the increases in real income achieved
over the past 30 years.
Utilization rates in recent peacetime expansions
have peaked at rates which have ranged from the
middle to the upper 80’s. Thus the excess capacity
implied from the current operating rate of 81 per-
cent should allow the economy in 1977 to generate
increases in output at rates greater than the long-run
trend rate. But the extent of this excess capacity may
be less than is implied by a comparison of the cur-
rently reported operating rate with previous peak
rates. In particular, analysts have noted that events
of the last few years, such as the quadrupling of oil
prices, have reduced the economy’s potential output.
Given the uncertainty of whether or not such events
have been fully captured by the recently revised ca-
pacity data, the economy may be closer to an effec-
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tive capacity constraint than is indicated by reported
data.t
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Fluctuations in inventory investment have been an
important influence on the recovery pattern to date.
Upon reflection the “pause” seems to be little more
than the economy’s reaction to the lack of further
inventory stimulus in the past two quarters, not a
t
For further articulation of this view, see Denis S. Karnosky.
“The Link Between Money and Prices — 1971-76,” this Re-
view (June 1976), pp. 17-23. Whether the recent capacity
revision reflects this type of analysis is unclear. The revision
does not directly incorporate any adjustment factor for the
effects of the oil price change on econonnic capacity, but it
may Indirectly reflect such events through the incorporation
of a recent McGraw-Hill survey of capacity utilization rates.
reflection of insufficient stimulus to aggregate de-
mand. Existing demand and supply conditions now
seem set for further economic expansion next year.
The relatively high unemployment rate continues
bothersome. This high rate, however, largely reflects
labor supply factors and is not necessarily indicative
of weak aggregate demand. Part of the unemploy-
ment is of a chronic nature which can only be solved
by structural reforms in the labor markets. As such,
adopting demand policies designed to reduce the un-
employment rate to levels achieved in other recov-
eries is likely to be frustrated by accelerating infla-
tion. Instead, policies designed to promote a favorable
environment for much needed capital investment
seem in order.
/
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